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Children are sensitive to a number of considerations influencing distributions of resources, including equality,
equity, and reciprocity. We tested whether children use a specific type of reciprocity norm—market norms—
in which resources are distributed differentially based strictly on amount offered in return. In two studies, 195
children 5–10 years and 60 adults distributed stickers to friends offering same or different amounts of money.
Overall, participants distributed more equally when offers were the same and more unequally when offers
were different. Although sensitive to why friends offered different amounts of money, children increasingly
incorporated market norms into their distributions with age, as the oldest children and adults distributed
more to those offering more, irrespective of the reasons provided.
People make decisions about allocating resources to
other people in many contexts. However, it is not
always clear how those allocations should be made.
The developmental literature has focused on chil-
dren’s developing conceptions of different kinds of
“fair” allocation strategies—equality and equity.
Equality is the relatively simple principle that
everyone gets the same. Consider, for example, a
situation where you have been tasked with dis-
tributing four new pens to two people. If using an
equality norm, you would distribute two pens to
each person. Equity is a more complex construction
of fairness involving assessments of deservingness
(e.g., how much a person contributes should deter-
mine the outcomes they experience; Carrell & Dit-
trich, 1978). Perhaps, one of the potential recipients
helped you complete another task earlier in the
day, an equitable distribution gives more to the
helpful person. Alternatively, one person may have
many pens and the other none; an equitable distri-
bution, in this case, gives more to the needy person.
A significant body of empirical research has
explored which kinds of equity considerations chil-
dren attend to and when (e.g., Baumard, Mascaro,
& Chevallier, 2012; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; Elen-
baas, Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Hamann, Ben-
der, & Tomasello, 2014; Kanngiesser & Warneken,
2012; Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Coo-
ley, & Killen, 2016).
In this paper, we consider a third norm of partic-
ular cultural and practical significance: market
exchange. What if people are buying and selling
pens? In a market exchange the allocation problem
is establishing a price: how to maximize returns
(for both buyer and seller). Although equity might
require that a more deserving person get more even
if they cannot pay more, the principles of market
exchange do not. In this sense, market norms can
be construed as qualitatively distinct from equality
and equity norms, which have more of a social or
personal element (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). To
extend the example provided earlier, of distributing
four pens to two people, a market exchange would
entail allocating the pens in such a way as to maxi-
mize the amount of resources received in return.
The “right” thing to do in a market is to get the
best price for your goods. Distributing this way
may not produce an equal outcome, or an equitable
outcome; however, it is appropriate under market
norms.
As noted earlier, children’s attention to equality
and equity tend to be studied in the context of
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fairness, to which children show a strong commit-
ment. In many contexts that have been studied,
children’s “fair” distributions tend to be equal, par-
ticularly in third-party distribution contexts (i.e.,
when the participants themselves are not recipi-
ents). In third-party contexts, for example, children
as young as 6–8 years are averse to unequal distri-
butions and will even throw away odd items to
preserve equality (Shaw & Olson, 2012). Attention
to equality may be present in infancy (Sloane, Bail-
largeon, & Premack, 2012), which suggests that it
emerges early—even before children can physically
engage in third-party distributions.
Although often motivated by equality, children
are not wholly committed to it in all contexts. For
example, children as young as 3.5 years help pro-
tagonists preferentially distribute to puppet friends
and family members compared with strangers in
third-party contexts (Olson & Spelke, 2008). In a
shift toward equity, children as young as 5–6 years
distribute unequally to rectify third-party ingroup
inequalities (e.g., Elenbaas et al., 2016). Preschool
children also distribute differently depending on
their preference for a recipient (Chernyak & Sobel,
2016); children of this age will also take merit and
past behavior into account when deciding how to
distribute items (Baumard et al., 2012). For exam-
ple, when resources are less plentiful, 4.5-year-olds
give more to helpful versus unhelpful recipients
(Kenward & Dahl, 2011). Thus, young children will
deviate from equal distributions to perform equita-
ble distributions, which consider a potential recipi-
ent’s deservedness along various dimensions
including need, effort, time, and/or status (see
Deutsch, 1975 for an early review of different
dimensions along which just distributions can be
made). Overall, with increasing age, children dis-
play an increasing departure from equal distribu-
tions based on justified equity concerns (e.g., merit,
need) from preschool age through at least middle
childhood (Schmidt, Svetlova, Johe, & Tomasello,
2016).
Although prior work has extensively explored
how equality and equity concerns guide children’s
distributions, much less is understood about the
influence of market norms. Though children lack
adult-like understanding of market principles, pos-
sibly due, in part, to parents’ reluctance to discuss
personal financial matters in the home (Romo,
2011), children regularly engage in exchange-type
behaviors (e.g., trading toys, food) wherein the goal
is to maximize value. For example, children at
lunch may seek out more desirable snacks and look
to friends to trade. Market norms reflect principles
(e.g., value, price) for resource distributions that
people, particularly those participating in a capital-
istic economy, grapple with on a day-to-day basis.
Within this type of economy, the receipt of
resources and goods is linked to the amount some-
one offers in exchange rather than linked to desert
or need (Fiske, 1991).
Market norms may be understood as a specific
form of reciprocity. Reciprocity involves giving
resources in the expectation (or in response to)
receipt of resources: You give to me so I give to
you. A significant body of research has explored
children’s sensitivity to reciprocity considerations.
Prior work in this area shows that children as
young as 3 years engage in direct reciprocity via
first-party (Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, & Murphy, 2013)
and third-party tasks (Olson & Spelke, 2008; see
House, Henrich, Sarnecka, & Silk, 2013, for over-
view of the development of contingent reciproca-
tion in children 3–7.5 years). For example, by
3.5 years, children track past behaviors to reason
about who should receive later resources (Olson &
Spelke, 2008), and by age 5 years, they share more
with partners who may reciprocate in the future
versus not (Sebastian-Enesco & Warneken, 2015).
The kind of reciprocity addressed in prior
research is a more general, informal form than that
involved in market norms. We suggest that market
norms are a specific kind of reciprocity involving
direct quid pro quo. Informal reciprocity involves a
loose account of balance in the long run. For exam-
ple, the expectation that a gift or favor may some-
day be returned, without explicit understanding of
the amount or timing, is informal reciprocity.
Indeed, it is a violation of informal reciprocity to
demand or offer direct quid pro quo. One cannot
offer to pay (or otherwise assign a specific value)
for a meal at a friend’s house (Tetlock, 2003). Nor
ought one to expect that the value received in
reciprocation matches the value given (the meal
you invite me to may not be equal in value to the
labor I expended helping you move). It is the
specific accounting character of tracking the particu-
lar value of goods during a single exchange that
distinguishes market exchanges from informal
reciprocity.
We operationalize market exchanges as those
involving money. How do children understand
exchanging goods for money? Clearly monetary
exchanges are not equal—everybody who walks in
to a store does not walk out with the same goods.
Monetary exchanges are also not based on equity
as traditionally conceived, because the amount of
money offered in a market exchange need not
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rectify inequalities or reward those who work
harder or are more deserving. For example, a per-
son may be highly deserving, but if they do not
provide the asking price, then they will not have
access to goods (Rizzo & Killen, 2016). In contrast,
in monetary exchanges, people will generally
receive goods in proportion to the amount they
offer. This relation is especially reliable in fixed-
price transactions (e.g., shopping) that characterize
most monetary exchanges for the population
involved in the current study. Neither norms of
equality nor norms of equity capture adult expecta-
tions for monetary exchanges, strictly conceived.
Finally, market exchanges are not equivalent to
other forms of reciprocity. Whereas reciprocity may
entail consideration of past or future reciprocation,
market exchanges can be based on singular interac-
tions with those one has not met before and is unli-
kely to meet again in the future. Although prior
research indicates that young children consider
reciprocity as it rests on enduring (or at least
repeated) personal relationships, it is unclear
whether children’s judgments involve one-shot mar-
ket exchanges. Whereas reciprocity may entail a
general sense of “do me a favor, and I’ll do you a
favor,” market exchanges entail more precise expec-
tations about the amount of timing of exchanges.
Though prior research exploring reciprocity in
children tests whether they are sensitive to past and
future behaviors when distributing resources, it is
unclear how children reason about market
exchanges in this stricter sense. Understanding core
market principles, such as the role of supply and
demand in determining a price, involves extended
development (see Siegler & Thompson, 1998). How-
ever, the basic intuition that it is acceptable to dis-
tribute more items to one who offers higher
payments may develop early, at least for children
in modern Western societies who grow up
immersed in a market economy—an aspect of
reciprocity that has yet, to our knowledge, to be
explored. More generally, it remains an open ques-
tion whether and how young children apply these
three norms (equality, equity, and market) in the
context of monetary exchanges.
Present Research
The present research tests how 5- to 10-year-old
children’s third-party distributions are affected by
money offers, as prior work in the areas of fairness
and merit understanding suggests that changes
should be observed across this age range. Attention
to equality has been observed in the youngest age
within this range (e.g., Shaw & Olson, 2012),
whereas attention to equity expands in scope. Thus,
for example, by preschool age (3–4 years), children
consider merit when determining how to distribute
items—that is, children allocate based on individual
contributions (Baumard et al., 2012). In contrast, by
10–11 years, children act on a more nuanced under-
standing of merit (and deservedness) to rectify
social inequalities—that is, older children seek to
correct disparities across groups (Elenbaas et al.,
2016). We, therefore, expected adherence to increas-
ingly shift toward incorporating equity concerns
across the age range. In addition, the youngest chil-
dren within this age range have been shown to
track cooperative behaviors and engage in contin-
gent reciprocation (Sebastian-Enesco & Warneken,
2015). For these reasons, it is of particular interest
to determine how children would reason about
market norms in the context of these developmental
changes.
Across two studies, children (and adults as a
comparison group) help a Giver distribute extra
stickers. Using a third-party design allowed us to
present the relationships among the Giver and
Friends neutrally, thus providing a better test of
market norms (which should apply even among
strangers), and eliminating the child’s own stake in
the distributions. In Study 1, participants help a
Giver distribute extra stickers among the Giver and
two friends. In Study 2, participants help a Giver
distribute extra stickers between two friends only.
In both studies, friends make offers to the Giver for
the extra stickers, offering no money (allowing for
comparisons to previous literature), equal amounts
of money, or different amounts of money. When
offers are different, the reasons vary: (a) one friend
simply offers more money (no reason provided), (b)
one friend refuses to pay despite having funds
available, or (c) one friend wants to pay, but lacks
available funds. We include these scenarios to test,
in a market exchange context, whether differences
in monetary offers are the only factor that matters
or whether children factor in equity concerns: Do
you get what you pay for, or what you deserve?
Predictions
If guided strictly by equality norms, then chil-
dren will distribute stickers equally irrespective of
the offers. If guided by equity, then children will
distribute stickers equally when offers are the same
(i.e., when no money is involved, and when equal
amounts of money are offered). Equity norms
would also predict that when offers are different
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and no explanation for the difference is provided,
or when one friend is able but refuses to pay, chil-
dren will distribute unequally in favor of the friend
offering more. However, when someone is willing
but unable to pay, equity would favor either an
equal distribution (both participants are deserving)
or an unequal distribution in favor of the person
who is unable to pay (to rectify an inequality).
Finally, if guided by market norms, children will
strictly distribute stickers based on the payment
offered. That is, when offers are the same, children
will distribute equally, and when offers are differ-
ent, children will distribute unequally in favor of
the friend offering more. Thus, trials where one
friend is willing but unable to pay provide the
clearest test of whether children adhere to equity
versus market norms (i.e., equity entails equal dis-
tributions or favoring the friend willing but unable
to pay; market entails favoring the friend offering
more money).
Finally, we predict that the degree to which chil-
dren depart from equality will differ by age. That
is, younger children (5–6 years) are predicted to
display a stronger commitment to equal distribu-
tions than older children (9–10 years) and adults.
Younger children may also be more influenced by
equity (ability to pay) than older children and
adults, who have more experience with fixed prices
(e.g., the grocery store does not care how rich you
are). Thus, we predict that principles for all three
types of exchanges will be available from an early
age, but the degree to which children appeal to
equity and to market considerations will increase




Participants included 76 children between the
ages of 5 and 10 years, subdivided into three age
groups: 5–6 years (n = 27, M = 5.94, SD = .56, 15
female), 7–8 years (n = 24, M = 7.71, SD = .49, 15
female), and 9–10 years (n = 25, M = 9.70, SD = .48,
12 females). Twenty-five adults (M = 19.10,
SD = .93, 16 female) also participated. Prior to ana-
lyzing the data, an additional 13 children were
excluded for the following reasons: three due to
experimenter error (e.g., recording errors), four due
to observing other participants complete the task,
four due to parental or friend interference, and two
for not completing the task. Only one adult was
excluded due to experimenter error. Children were
recruited and tested in lab spaces at two local
museums between September 2015 and January
2016. We did not collect data on race, ethnicity, nor
socioeconomic status; however, one museum
required an entrance fee, whereas the other did not.
Adults were recruited via a university psychology
subject pool between October 2015 and November
2015. Children received a thank-you gift for partici-
pating, and adults received course credit.
Materials
Materials included laminated squares depicting
one of five shapes: star, circle, triangle, crescent, or
hexagon. The laminated squares with shapes repre-
sented the stickers participants were asked to dis-
tribute on behalf of the Giver. Depending on the
trial, there were four or five laminated squares of
each shape, and shapes within a trial were all col-
ored the same, with no color repeated across trials.
Shapes were placed in collection bowls for Friends
and/or on top of a plastic bag for the Giver, allow-
ing us to more clearly distinguish Friends from the
Giver. Stickers for the Giver were placed on a plas-
tic bag, as it is more plausible that extra stickers
(which the Giver had brought) would be contained
in a bag rather than in a bowl prior to distributing.
Design
Participants heard third-party vignettes describ-
ing situations where friends offered no money (no
money), equal amounts of money (one quarter each;
equal money), or different amounts of money (see
Table 1 for sample vignettes of each type). The fol-
lowing different offers were made: (a) more/less:
one friend offers two quarters, one friend offers one
quarter, (b) refusal: one friend offers one quarter,
one friend refuses to offer the one quarter they have
available, and (c) inability: one friend offers one
quarter, one friend offers zero quarters due to being
unable to pay (i.e., having no quarters). For each
scenario, there were two trials—one requiring the
distribution of four stickers, and one requiring the
distribution of five stickers. Thus, participants
heard 10 vignettes total (see Table 2 for complete
design).
The 10 vignettes were presented in three blocks:
no-money vignettes, money vignettes involving the
distribution of four stickers (even), and money
vignettes involving the distribution of five stickers
(odd). The no-money block was always presented
first to avoid potential effects of money influencing
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participants’ distributions in the absence of money,
and the order of the other two blocks was random-
ized. The order of the vignettes within blocks
was randomized and the side on which unequal
offers were made was counterbalanced across
participants.
Procedure
Children. Before the session began, a parent/
guardian provided written consent and the child
provided oral assent. The child then worked with
an experimenter individually who told them that
they were going to hear some stories and answer
some questions. The experimenter read 10 vignettes
displayed on a computer, each depicting three char-
acters—a Giver and two friends, gender matched to
the child—and children were tasked with helping
the Giver decide how to give away the Giver’s
extra stickers. During each vignette, children were
told that the Giver could give away the extra stick-
ers any way they wanted—they could give them to
both friends or to just one friend, and they could
give them all away or keep some for the Giver. The
Giver was included as a possible recipient to allow
for equal distributions to the Friends during the
five-sticker trials. While reading the vignette, the
experimenter laid out all stickers directly in front of
the child, in a row. The child was then instructed to
put stickers for the friends in corresponding collec-
tion bowls (situated on either side of the computer)
and to put stickers for the Giver on a plastic bag
(situated in front of the computer). This arrange-
ment of collection bowls and bag mirrored the spa-
tial relationship of the characters on the computer
screen (Figure 1). The number of stickers dis-
tributed to each character was recorded. At the con-
clusion of the task, children were asked why they
distributed stickers as they had during the last trial.
Responses were gathered for exploratory purposes
and are not discussed further.
Adults. Adults provided consent and com-
pleted the same task as presented to children.
Results
To test our predictions, we first tallied the num-
ber of stickers distributed to each possible recipient
(Friend A, Friend B, Giver). When different offers
were made, Friend A was defined as the friend
who offered more money. When same offers were
Table 1
Sample Vignettes Heard by Participants
Offer type Vignette type Vignette
Same No money Sally is at the park with her friends Bernice and Hazel. Sally has some extra stickers she doesn’t need. Bernice says,
“Sally, can I have some stickers?” and Hazel says, “Sally, can I have some stickers?”
Same Equal money Lucy is at the park with her friends Olive and Barbara. Lucy has some extra stickers she doesn’t need. Olive says,
“Lucy, can I have some stickers? I’ll pay you 1 quarter for some stickers,” and Barbara says, “Lucy, can I have
some stickers? I’ll pay you 1 quarter for some stickers.”
Different More/less Georgette is at the park with her friends Alice and Cecelia. Georgette has some extra stickers she doesn’t need.
Alice says, “Georgette, can I have some stickers? I’ll pay you 1 quarter for some stickers,” and Cecelia says,
“Georgette, can I have some stickers? I’ll pay you 2 quarters for some stickers.”
Different Refusal Colleen is at the park with her friends Beatrice and Myrtle. Colleen has some extra stickers she doesn’t need.
Beatrice says, “Colleen, can I have some stickers? I have 1 quarter, but I don’t want to pay,” and Myrtle says,
“Colleen, can I have some stickers? I’ll pay you 1 quarter for some stickers.”
Different Inability Kelly is at the park with her friends Sue and Ida. Kelly has some extra stickers she doesn’t need. Sue says, “Kelly,
can I have some stickers? I’ll pay you 1 quarter for some stickers,” and Ida says, “Kelly, can I have some stickers?
I want to pay, but I don’t have a quarter.”
Note. Vignettes gender-matched to child. Girls heard about friends with female names (included above), boys heard about friends with
male names. After each vignette, participants’ distribution options were reiterated.
Table 2





offer Friend B’s offer
Same No money 0 0
Equal money 1 quarter 1 quarter
Different More/less 2 quarters 1 quarter
Refusal 1 quarter 0 (though 1 quarter is
visible in B’s bag)
Inability 1 quarter 0
Note. In Study 1, participants distributed four or five stickers,
depending on the block. In Study 2, participants only distributed
five stickers.
Children and Market Norms 2075
made, Friend A was simply defined as the friend
on the left.
Same Versus Different Offers
We first predicted that participants would dis-
tribute stickers more equally when offers were the
same: When offers were different, equity and mar-
ket considerations should lead participants to dis-
tribute more stickers to friends offering more
money. To test this, we collapsed across same trials
(no money, equal money) and collapsed across dif-
ferent trials (more/less, refusal, inability), and then
for same versus different trials separately, we calcu-
lated the proportion of trials for which an equal
number of stickers was distributed to Friend A and
Friend B (i.e., zero to each, one to each, or two to
each). Proportions were used to permit comparison
across the different numbers of trials (two same
offer trials, three different offer trials). We con-
ducted a repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with offer type (same, different) and
sticker number (even, odd) as the within-partici-
pants factors and age group (5–6, 7–8, 9–10, adults)
as the between-participants factor.
As predicted, participants were more likely to
distribute stickers equally during same (.88) versus
different (.42) trials, F(1, 97) = 189.22, p < .001,
g2p = .66. However, this effect interacted with age
group, F(3, 97) = 13.25, p < .001, g2p = .29. To exam-
ine the interaction, we tested the effect of offer type
within each age group considered individually, set-
ting our alpha level for post hoc comparisons of the
interaction to .0125 (.05/4 age groups) to account
for multiple comparisons. At all age groups, partici-
pants distributed more equally when offers were
the same versus different (5–6: 0.72 vs. 0.56; 7–8:
0.89 vs. 0.48; 9–10: 0.94 vs. 0.40; adults: 0.97 vs.
0.23; ps ≤ .012). See Figure 2 for distributions by
offer type and age group. Finally, there was a main
effect of sticker number, F(1, 97) = 5.89, p = .017,
g2p = .06, indicating that participants distributed
more equally between the two friends when an
even number of stickers was available to give away
than when an odd number of stickers was available
to give away (.68 vs. .62). This result may be due to
the relative ease of distributing an even versus odd
number of stickers between two people. No other
significant results were found.
No-Money Versus Equal Money Offers
We next tested whether participants’ distribu-
tions differed during same offers when money was
involved versus not involved. Testing whether this
is the case serves as an important control to check
that introducing money offers does not unexpect-
edly influence behaviors. Again, our dependent
variable was the proportion of trials on which par-
ticipants distributed the stickers evenly between A
and B. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA
with vignette type (no money, equal money) and
sticker number (even, odd) as the within-partici-
pants factors and age group (5–6, 7–8, 9–10, adults)
as the between-participants factor. We obtained
only one significant effect, a main effect of age
group, F(3, 97) = 7.35, p < .001, g2p = .19. Children
5–6 years distributed less equally than participants
in all other age groups (5–6: 0.72; 7–8: 0.89; 9–10:
0.94; adults: 0.97; all ps < .01). Thus, the inclusion
of money in the allocation context had no bearing
Figure 1. Sample vignettes: (a) equal money, even number of
stickers; (b) inability, odd number of stickers. After hearing vign-
ettes, participants distributed stickers matching those present on
the computer screen to the recipients. [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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on the likelihood of distributing equally when
offers were the same.
Different Offers: Market Norms Versus Equity Norms
Turning to trials where different offers were
made, we predicted that, if strictly adhering to
market norms, participants would distribute more
stickers to Friend A than Friend B, because Friend
A was defined as the one who offered more. How-
ever, equity norms would dictate equal or more
favorable distributions to the friend willing but
unable to pay. To test this, we calculated a differ-
ence score—subtracting the number of stickers dis-
tributed to Friend B from the number of stickers
distributed to Friend A. Positive values indicate
more stickers for Friend A, whereas negative val-
ues indicate more stickers for Friend B. We con-
ducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with vignette
type (more/less, refusal, inability) and sticker num-
ber (four, five) as the within-participants factors
and age group (5–6, 7–8, 9–10, adults) as the
between-participants factor. This analysis yielded
main effects of vignette type, F(2, 194) = 15.88,
p < .001, g2p = .14, and age group, F(3, 97) = 10.10,
p < .001, g2p = .24. Participants distributed more
stickers to Friend A during both more/less (.87)
and refusal (.96) trials than during inability (.35)
trials (ps < .001), suggesting that participants are
sensitive to the reasons for which friends offer no
money. Again, setting our alpha level to .0125 to
account for multiple comparisons, we found that
the difference in the number of stickers distributed
to Friend A versus Friend B was smaller for all
groups of children than for adults (5–6: 0.35; 7–8:
0.58; 9–10: 0.75; adults: 1.23; ps < .01). See Figure 3
for distributions by vignette type and age group.
No other significant results were found.
We next tested whether participants reliably dis-
tributed more stickers to the friend offering more
money, testing participants’ commitment to equity
versus market norms. That is, we tested whether
participants distributed significantly more stickers
to Friend A than to Friend B than would be
expected by chance (0). Because no effect of sticker
number was found, we collapsed across this vari-
able in this analysis (one-sample t-test; alpha not
adjusted given independence of t-tests). At all age
levels, participants distributed stickers to Friend A
above chance during more/less (5–6: 1.30; 7–8: 1.58;
9–10: 1.84; adults: 2.24) and refusal (5–6: 1.07; 7–8:
1.42; 9–10: 1.88; adults: 3.32) trials (ps < .02). How-
ever, during inability trials, only children 9–
10 years and adults distributed stickers above
chance to Friend A (5–6: 0.30; 7–8: 0.46; 9–10:
0.80; adults: 1.84; ps for the latter two age
groups ≤ .002), demonstrating that older children
and adults are more likely to adhere to market
norms irrespective of the reasons for which lower
offers are made.
Zero Offers: Market Norms Versus Equity Norms
Finally, we considered how often participants
gave a nonzero number of stickers to the friend
offering less. That is, did they adopt a strategy in
Figure 2. Proportion equal distributions to friends during Study 1.
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which one who does not pay gets nothing (which
would be consistent with a pure market norm), or
did they give at least something to the person offer-
ing less (indicating some degree of equity)? To test
this, we tallied the number of trials on which par-
ticipants (by age group, collapsed across sticker
number) distributed zero stickers to friends offering
less money during more/less trials and no money
during refusal and inability trials. This was done to
test whether participants engaged in a pure-profit
strategy (i.e., distributed stickers only to the friend
offering more money) without concern for equity,
which would predict that participants would, for
example, be more likely to distribute zero stickers
to the friend refusing versus willing but unable to
pay. On this analysis, we found that overall partici-
pants rarely gave nothing to the friend offering less
money. During more/less trials, friends offering
one fewer quarter received nothing on 14 of 202 tri-
als (6.93% overall; 5–6: 8/54 trials; 7–8: 1/48 trials;
9–10: 3/50 trials; adults: 2/50 trials). Similar rates
of zero distributions were given when the friend
offering less was willing but unable to pay (5.94%
overall; 5–6: 5/54 trials; 7–8: 4/48 trials; 9–10: 1/50
trials; adults: 2/50 trials). However, participants
were more inclined to give nothing to the friend
refusing to pay (19.31% overall; 5–6: 8/54 trials; 7–
8: 11/48 trials; 9–10: 8/50 trials; adults: 12/50 tri-
als). Interestingly, participants’ zero distributions
did not differ by age group during any trial type,
as assessed via logistic regressions where age group
was entered as a categorical predictor and decision
to give nothing versus at least one sticker was
entered as the binary-dependent variable. These
results are consistent with those from the previous
analyses showing that children are sensitive to the
reason for the no-money offer and suggest that chil-
dren incorporate equity concerns into their distribu-
tion decisions in this market context.
Discussion
Overall, throughout the age range tested here (5–
10 years and adults), participants tended to dis-
tribute stickers equally between friends when offers
were the same, consistent with prior research show-
ing that children adhere to an equality-distribution
strategy in third-party contexts. However, partici-
pants (again, in all age groups) were more likely to
distribute unequally when different offers were
made. Participants distributed equally on fewer
than half of the unequal trials (42%), which is in
stark contrast to the proportion of equal distribu-
tions observed when offers were the same (88%).
Thus, different offers can encourage children to
depart from equality when distributing items. Inter-
estingly, although participants in all age groups dis-
tributed more stickers to the friend who offered
more money during more/less and refusal trials,
only the oldest children and adults distributed
more stickers to the friend offering more money
during inability trials. This suggests that there is an
increase with age in children’s willingness to aban-
don equal or equitable norms for distributions and
Figure 3. Difference in the number of stickers distributed to friends (where positive numbers indicate a preference for the friend offer-
ing more) during Study 1.
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adhere to market norms when they conflict, a point
to which we return in the General Discussion.
In Study 1, participants could have employed an
equality-distribution strategy by distributing odd
items to the Giver—and indeed, participants did
regularly distribute items to the Giver. Because
Study 1 allowed for equal distributions on each
trial, it does not provide the most sensitive test of
children’s commitment to equal distributions, nor
does it tell us how sensitive children are to the dif-
ferent ways in which offers can be unequal. It is,
thus, an open question how children would
respond if unable to distribute equally on each trial.
The purpose of Study 2 was to test whether even
the youngest children would more consistently
depart from equality when the task did not permit
equal distributions on a given trial. To test this, on
every trial, participants were tasked with distribut-
ing an odd number of stickers (i.e., five; no four-
sticker trials included) and were unable to dis-
tribute to the Giver (i.e., they could only distribute
between friends A and B). Study 2 also provides an




Participants included 119 children between the
ages of 5 and 10 years, subdivided into three age
groups: 5–6 years (n = 41, M = 5.95, SD = .61, 20
female), 7–8 years (n = 42, M = 7.91, SD = .58, 21
female), and 9–10 years (n = 36, M = 10.03,
SD = .55, 16 female), and 35 adults (M = 19.05,
SD = .69, 18 female). Prior to analyzing the data, an
additional three children were excluded: two due to
not understanding English and one due to watching
a previous participant complete the task. Only one
adult was excluded due to experimenter error. Chil-
dren were recruited and tested in lab spaces between
June 2016 and July 2016 at the same museums where
testing took place in Study 1. As in Study 1, we did
not collect data on race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic
status. Adults were recruited via a university psy-
chology subject pool between October 2016 and
November 2016. Children received a thank-you gift
for participating, and adults received course credit.
Materials
Materials were the same as those used in Study
1 with one exception—there was no plastic bag, as
participants were required to distribute all the stick-
ers to the friends.
Design
Participants heard the same third-party vignettes
describing situations where friends offered no
money (no money), equal amounts of money (one
quarter each; equal money), or different amounts of
money. As in Study 1, when offering different
amounts of money, the following offers were made:
(a) more/less: one friend offers two quarters, one
friend offers one quarter, (b) refusal: one friend
offers one quarter, one friend refuses to offer the
one quarter they have available, and (c) inability:
one friend offers one quarter, one friend offers zero
quarters due to being unable to pay. Thus, partici-
pants heard five vignettes total. On every trial, par-
ticipants were tasked with distributing five stickers.
The no-money vignette was always presented first,
and the other four vignettes were presented in ran-
domized order.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as Study 1 with
one exception–participants were told that the Giver
could not keep any of the extra stickers for them-
selves; they could give them to both friends or to
just one friend. As before, the arrangement of the
bowls mirrored the spatial relation of the friends on
the computer screen and children, for exploratory
purposes, were asked why they distributed stickers
the way they had after the last trial. Responses are
not discussed further. The number of stickers dis-
tributed to each friend was recorded.
Results
To test our predictions, we first tallied the num-
ber of stickers distributed to each recipient (Friend
A, Friend B). As before, when different offers were
made, Friend A was defined as the friend who
offered more money; when same offers were made,
Friend A was simply defined as the friend on the
left.
Same Versus Different Offers
In line with Study 1, we predicted that, given
equity and market concerns, participants would dis-
tribute more stickers to Friend A than Friend B dur-
ing different versus same trials. To test this, we
calculated the proportion of stickers distributed to
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Friend A during same (no money, equal money)
and different (more/less, refusal, inability) trials. As
before, proportions were used to allow for compar-
ison across the different numbers of trials (two
same offer trials, three different offer trials). Values
close to .50 indicate no preference, whereas values
above .50 indicate a preference for Friend A. We
conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with offer
type (same, different) as the within-participants fac-
tor and age group (5–6, 7–8, 9–10, adults) as the
between-participants factor. This analysis yielded
main effects of offer type, F(1, 150) = 92.23,
p < .001, g2p = .38, and age group, F(3, 150) = 7.13,
p < .001, g2p = .13, but no interaction. As in Study
1, we set our alpha level to .0125 (i.e., .05/4) to
account for multiple comparisons. Regardless of
age, participants distributed more stickers to Friend
A when offers were different (.66) than when they
were the same (.51). However, children 5–6 years
distributed fewer stickers to Friend A than children
7–8 years and adults (5–6: 0.53; 7–8: 0.59; 9–10:
0.58; adults: 0.63; ps ≤ .002). See Figure 4 for distri-
butions by offer type and age group.
Reanalysis of Study 1. The findings reported
above are generally similar to those observed in
Study 1. Nonetheless, to enable a more direct com-
parison, we applied the analysis employed in Study
2 to the data from Study 1. That is, we calculated
the proportion of stickers distributed to Friend A
given the number of stickers distributed to both
friends during each trial. We then conducted a
repeated-measures ANOVA with offer type (same,
different) and sticker number (Even, Odd) as the
within-participants factors and age group (5–6, 7–8,
9–10, adults) as the between-participants factor.
This analysis yielded main effects of offer type, F
(1, 97) = 138.56, p < .001, g2p = .59, and age group,
F(3, 97) = 7.96, p < .001, g2p = .20, and an Offer
Type 9 Age Group interaction, F(3, 97) = 3.09,
p = .031, g2p = .09. (Note that these effects are the
same as those found in the original analysis of
Study 1, indicating that the two different analytic
methods yielded the same patterns.) As in Study 2,
participants in Study 1 distributed more stickers to
Friend A when offers were different (.61) than
when they were the same (.48), and this trend was
observed across all age groups even after setting
our alpha level to .0125 to account for multiple
comparisons (ps < .001).
No-Money Versus Equal Money Offers
We next tested whether participants’ distribu-
tions differed during same offers when money was
involved versus not involved—again as a control to
ensure that the inclusion of money per se did not
unexpectedly influence behaviors. To do this, we
tested whether the difference in the number of
stickers distributed to the friends differed by
vignette type. A repeated-measures ANOVA with
vignette type (no money, equal money) as the
within-participants factor and age group (5–6, 7–8,
9–10, adults) as the between-participants factor
yielded no main effects nor an interaction. Thus,
Figure 4. Proportion of stickers distributed to Friend A during Study 2.
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participants’ distributions did not differ depending
on whether money was involved.
Different Offers: Equity Norms Versus Market Norms
Turning to trials where different offers were
made, we predicted, as before, that if strictly adher-
ing to market norms, participants would distribute
more stickers to Friend A than Friend B. However,
appeals to equity norms would yield greater distri-
butions to friends willing but unable to pay as com-
pared with friends offering more or refusing to pay.
As in Study 1, we tested this with a difference score
(A–B). We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA
with vignette type (more/less, refusal, inability) as
the within-participants factor and age group (5–6,
7–8, 9–10, adults) as the between-participants factor.
This analysis yielded main effects of vignette type,
F(2, 300) = 11.12, p < .001, g2p = .07, and age group,
F(3, 150) = 5.21, p = .002, g2p = .09, but no interac-
tion. Setting our alpha level to .0125 to account for
multiple comparisons, we found that the difference
in the number of stickers distributed to the friends
was greater during the refusal trial (1.81) than
during both the more/less (1.10) and inability (0.88)
trials (ps ≤ .002). Further, the difference in the num-
ber of stickers distributed to the friends by the
youngest children (5–6 years) was smaller than the
difference observed in children 7–8 years and
adults (5–6: 0.63; 7–8: 1.52; 9–10: 1.07; adults: 1.82;
ps ≤ .005). See Figure 5 for distributions by vignette
type and age group.
We next tested whether participants reliably dis-
tributed more stickers to the friend offering more
money, testing participants’ commitment to equity
versus market norms. That is, we tested whether
participants distributed significantly more stickers
to Friend A versus Friend B than would be
expected by chance (0; one-sample t-test; alpha not
adjusted given independence of t-tests). Children 7–
10 and adults reliably distributed more stickers to
Friend A during more/less (5–6: 0.71; 7–8: 1.33; 9–
10: 0.89; adults: 1.46) and refusal (5–6: 0.71; 7–8:
2.19; 9–10: 1.72; adults: 2.60) trials (ps < .001). How-
ever, only children 7–8 years and adults reliably
distributed more stickers to Friend A during inabil-
ity trials (5–6: 0.46; 7–8: 1.05; 9–10: 0.61; adults:
1.40; ps < .01).
Zero Offers: Market Norms Versus Equity Norms
Finally, to test whether participants engaged in a
pure-profit strategy, we tallied the number of trials
on which participants (by age group) distributed
zero stickers to friends offering less money during
the more/less trial and no money during refusal
and inability trials. As in Study 1, participants were
more inclined to give nothing to the friend refusing
to pay (19.48% overall; 5–6: 7/41 trials; 7–8: 12/42
trials; 9–10: 4/36 trials; adults: 7/35 trials) versus
the friends offering one fewer quarter (6.49% over-
all; 5–6: 7/41 trials; 7–8: 3/42 trials; 9–10: 0/36 tri-
als; adults: 0/35 trials) and willing but unable to
pay (6.49% overall; 5–6: 2/41 trials; 7–8: 6/42 trials;
Figure 5. Difference in the number of stickers distributed to friends (where positive numbers indicate a preference for the friend offer-
ing more) during Study 2.
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9–10: 2/36 trials; adults: 0/35 trials). Consistent
with Study 1, participants’ zero distributions did
not differ by age group during any trial type, as
assessed via logistic regressions where age group
was entered as a categorical predictor and decision
to give nothing versus at least one sticker was
entered as the binary-dependent variable.
Discussion
Study 2 was designed to provide a stronger test
of children’s commitment to equal distributions by
requiring participants to distribute an odd number
of stickers between two friends. Consistent with the
results from Study 1, including a re-analysis of
Study 1 data using the Study 2 analysis, partici-
pants were more likely to distribute stickers
unequally when different offers were made
(assessed by determining whether there was a pref-
erence for Friend A over Friend B). Additionally,
participants’ distributions were sensitive to the dis-
tribution context, such that the difference in the
number of stickers distributed to the friends was
greater when someone refused to pay versus when
someone was unable to pay or simply paid more
(with no reason provided). This result is in line
with those from Rizzo et al. (2016), where children
6–8 years considered the welfare of the recipients
when deciding how to distribute different kinds of
resources. In addition, though participants rarely
gave nothing to the friend offering no money, they
were more inclined to do so when friends were
refusing versus willing but unable to pay. Our
results suggest that children were similarly sensitive
to the welfare of the recipients, as those willing but
unable to pay were given more stickers than those
able but refusing to pay.
Although the difference in the number of stickers
distributed to Friend A versus Friend B was greater
during refusal than both more/less and inability tri-
als, the differences in distributions to the two
friends differed from zero for only older children
and adults (though distributions for the youngest
age group trended in the same direction for each
condition). This last result demonstrates that chil-
dren are willing to depart from equal distributions
but increasingly so with age.
General Discussion
Across two studies, participants decided how a set
of resources (extra stickers) should be distributed to
two friends. In Study 1, participants distributed
stickers with the possibility of reserving (not giving
away) some, and in Study 2, participants dis-
tributed stickers exhaustively (all stickers given
away). During each trial, friends offered the Giver
either the same or different amounts of money and
it was up to the participant to decide how the
Giver should give away their extra stickers. In both
studies, participants distributed stickers more
equally when offers were the same and more
unequally when offers were different. This is a
novel finding, demonstrating that children as young
as 5–6 years of age are willing to depart from
equality when considering a person who offers
more money. It is also consistent with prior work
showing that children incorporate equity concerns
(e.g., merit, need) into their distribution decisions.
Last, it extends prior work on children’s reciprocity
by demonstrating that children are sensitive to rela-
tive quantity, such that those who offer more
(money) receive more.
In addition to studying equality and equity
norms, we examined the use of market norms, in
which a person attempts to maximize monetary
gains. The use of market norms would lead partici-
pants to select the friend who offers more money,
regardless of other considerations (such as ability or
willingness to pay). In the present study, older chil-
dren and adults distributed more consistently based
on market considerations than did younger chil-
dren. The key test came on trials that pitted one
person able to pay against another who was willing
but unable to pay. Older participants gave fewer
stickers to the person unable to pay. In contrast,
younger children did not penalize partners who
were willing but unable to pay: They received the
same number of stickers as those who could (and
did) pay. One way to interpret these results is that
older participants relied on market norms even
when those norms conflicted with equity (which
would favor the person unable to pay). In contrast,
younger participants relied on market norms when
those norms did not obviously conflict with equity
(no explanation or unwillingness to pay).
Despite overall very similar patterns across the
two studies, participants’ decreased attention to
equity norms was found only in Study 1 and not in
Study 2. We suspect that these study differences
are due to one important methodological difference.
Recall that in Study 2, it was simply not possible
for participants to distribute equally on any trial, as
they did in Study 1. As a consequence, participants
who would otherwise have engaged in equal distri-
butions were forced to shift their strategy, engaging
in a “next-best” distribution strategy that was less
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consistent and more variable, introducing noise and
yielding the different results. When equal distribu-
tions were possible (Study 1), the developmental
patterns were clear. Overall, then, these results sug-
gest that older children and adults may be less con-
cerned about equity, strictly conceived, in these
types of exchanges. In this way, results are consis-
tent with our prediction that children, increasingly
so with age, can entertain at least three types of
norms when deciding how to distribute items in
market-oriented exchanges.
The current study also extends research on chil-
dren’s sensitivity to reciprocity in exchanges. Previ-
ous research has shown that quite young children
are more likely to give resources to others who have
or will give them resources (e.g., Sebastian-Enesco &
Warneken, 2015; Warneken & Tomasello, 2013).
However, from that prior work it was not clear
whether the amount given would be directly related
to the amount received (or expected), as would be
the case in more strictly market exchanges. In the
current study, we found that even the youngest chil-
dren did distribute more to those offering more.
This consideration of quantity goes beyond a simple
or informal construction of reciprocity. Older chil-
dren and adults demonstrated an even stricter form
of market norms: The amount given depends only
on the amount offered not the reasons behind the
offer. Specifically, in the case of the friend willing
but unable to pay, general reciprocity would favor
giving. That friend may be able to reciprocate,
perhaps nonmonetarily, in the future.
In light of support for this last prediction, we
argue that young children do follow market norms
when distributing or exchanging resources, at least
in addition to norms of equality and equity. One of
the claims of this paper is that market norms function
as a specific form of reciprocity that regulates
exchanges. In the present studies, market exchanges
were evoked by including money in the exchange
contexts—though, we acknowledge that not all mar-
ket exchanges involve money (e.g., barter systems),
nor is it the case that market exchanges require
money. For this reason, observed trends may not
extend to children outside our WEIRD (western, edu-
cated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) samples
(e.g., consider that Blake and colleagues found clear
developmental differences in the rejection of disad-
vantageous inequity across different cultures,
demonstrating the importance of context in examin-
ing these issues; Blake et al., 2015). An alternative
perspective, however, is that equality and equity are
not distinct norms but rather distinct aspects or vari-
eties of market considerations. From an economic
perspective, all exchanges are based on expected util-
ity: The person making the offer is maximizing some
return. The return may be material (the amount of
goods received) or immaterial (friendship, goodwill,
or indebtedness of the recipient). The return may also
be quite abstract, as in a sense of justice being done,
or a “warm-glow” from having done the right thing
(Andreoni, 1990). Equality and equity are just differ-
ent kinds of utilities to be maximized. We do not take
a position on the nature of equality and equity moti-
vations nor on whether such norms are fundamen-
tally different from utility maximization. However,
one key feature of money is that it is quantifiable.
Money provides a common medium in which differ-
ent values can be expressed. Therefore, monetary
exchanges may be most suited to the application of
market norms that depend on specific assessment of
quantities (values) exchanged. The current study
demonstrates that young children do consider the
specific amounts of goods and money offered in
exchange, at least in addition to more abstract goals
of equality and equity. Older children and adults
privilege the linkage between amounts offered in
exchange above equality and equity, at least in this
cultural context and this specific context of exchang-
ing goods for money. Recognizing that it is right or
appropriate to do so (in the context of exchanging
goods for money) is what we take to be the market
norm.
The current study used money as the medium of
exchange. Previous literature suggests that the
inclusion of money may prompt children to adopt a
more market-oriented perspective (Gasiorowska,
Chaplin, Zaleskiewicz, Wygrab, & Vohs, 2016;
Gasiorowska, Zaleskiewicz, & Wygrab, 2012). Con-
trary to this prediction, we did not find that distri-
bution decisions differed when comparing no
money and equal money trials. However, our stud-
ies were not designed to test the effects of money
per se, and future work should test whether the
same results would be observed with other, non-
monetary forms of exchange (e.g., bartering).
In addition, the transactions in the current study
were introduced as exchanges among friends, leav-
ing open how children would distribute resources
in the context of strangers or family members
(Olson & Spelke, 2008). The use of friends may
have reduced market norms and increased concerns
with equality and equity, so it is all the more inter-
esting that even the youngest children adopted
market norms to guide their distribution decisions
in the context of friends. Perhaps asking children to
distribute among strangers would amplify effects of
market norms, or asking children to distribute
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among family members would decrease their
effects. Importantly, though, using a third-party
design limits selfish interests that participants could
bring to bear on the task—yielding results that can
more clearly speak to whether and when partici-
pants adhere to different norms. However, a first-
party design (one where a child would be a direct
stakeholder) would provide insight into how chil-
dren balance personal interests with concerns over
equality, equity, and maximizing returns. Another
aspect of the task framing was that distributions
did not involve a store context, which is the most
familiar place where market norms apply. It is an
open question whether we would observe similar
results in more market-oriented contexts (e.g., a
store). Though these open questions remain, it is
nonetheless interesting that children appealed to
market norms in this market exchange context
involving friends, outside a context that would
more clearly dictate distributing based on ability to
pay as would be the case in a store. Last, subse-
quent work should explore whether children explic-
itly reference market concerns when participating in
a market exchange. It could be that children display
market-oriented behaviors but motivate decisions
appealing to fairness norms—a finding that would
inform how children balance multiple concerns
simultaneously.
Conclusions
In line with prior work exploring children’s
attention to equity concerns when distributing
items, we found that children as young as 5–
6 years will depart from equality and use money
offers to guide their distribution decisions. In addi-
tion, we found that children are sensitive to the rea-
sons underlying the different offers—that is,
children penalize recipients refusing to pay more
than recipients willing but unable to pay. Last, par-
ticipants did not adhere to a pure-profit strategy—
participants still distributed stickers to friends offer-
ing no money or lesser amounts of money. Taken
together, these studies contribute to our under-
standing of factors influencing children’s distribu-
tion decisions with the novel finding that children
as young as 5–6 years will consider money offers
and depart from equal distributions.
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